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Abstract  
There  exists  a  huge  agrifood  potential  in  Ethiopia.  However,  the  country‟s  agrifood 
supply chains are underdeveloped to deliver quality supply to traders and supplement 
household  livelihoods  from  the  sector.  The  key  factors  that  determine  the  proper 
functioning of supplier-trader chains were not rigorously investigated, at least in the case 
study  area.  This  paper  aims  at  examining  the  key  determinants  in  choosing  vertical 
coordination  for  agrifood  products  in  Tigray,  Northern  Ethiopia.  Structured 
questionnaires were administered to 247 traders in 10 towns in Tigray. Probit model was 
employed to identify the key determinants of vertical coordination. Model results show 
that market information, product characteristics, firm characteristics, and product quality 
were found significant factors in determining the adoption of vertical coordination. An 
interesting finding is that traders tend to vertically coordinate so as to get credit from 
suppliers. Based on our findings  we suggest that strengthening quality assurance and 
contract enforcement institutions appears to be an important intervention area to improve 
the agrifood chain in the study area. Moreover, providing financial support to encourage 
the  private  sector  to  operate  in  agro-processing  is  among  the  efforts  that  need  to  be 
focused so that it facilitates the rural development process in the region.   
Key Words: vertical coordination, trader, supplier, agrifood, supply chain, Probit Model. 
1. Introduction 
Trading and processing firms use a continuum of vertical coordination (VC) mechanisms 
to acquire agrifood products. The VC continuum comprises of spot markets, contracts 
and vertical integration. VC in agrifood supply chains creates market linkages between 
traders and agricultural producers who suffer from market failures in many developing 
countries. In doing so VC facilitates integration of agricultural producers to the domestic 
and international markets.  
 
The agrifood chains enable traders and supermarket chains to acquire agrifood products 
for  processing  or  reselling.  Due  to  the  perishable  nature  of  agricultural  products, 
intermediation of traders and processors is necessary to get these products at consumers 
table.  The  existence  of  traders  and  processors  in  the  chain  facilitates  investment  in 
processing and preservation technologies which many of the rural producers are deprived 
of due to their poor financial circumstances.  Traders in the chain have taken the risk and 
invest in those technologies and fill the missing gap in both technology and financial 
constraints prevailing in the rural areas. 
 
Nevertheless,  weak  or  absent  vertical  coordination  between  producers  and 
traders/processors  for  agrifood  products  in  rural  Ethiopia  results  in  lower  market 
participation  of  smallholders  and  large  amount  of  the  produce  remain  at  farm  gate. 
Hitherto,  producers  who  are  largely  smallholders  have  not  been  able  to  generate 
sufficient  income  from  their  produce.  It  has  also  been  a  disincentive  to  improve 
production and productivity.  
 
Ethiopia has huge potential in the production of several agrifood products. The potential 
for dairy, honey and fruit production is very large but meager amount has been put for 
markets  due  to  poor  coordination  of  agrifood  supply  chain.  The  Ethiopian  livestock 
population is the largest in Africa and 80% of the rural population possesses livestock 
(FAO 2010). However, its contribution to the nation‟s economy is limited as the number 
of livestock is generally regarded as a sign of wealth, rather than as an asset generating 2 
 
income. As a result, most livestock products have not yet been channeled to the market 
system. And in case they are marketed, they rarely meet minimum quality and safety 
standards due to adulteration, poor storage and processing conditions. Honey production 
is expected to be higher due to the large number of bee colonies. In 2009, Ethiopia was 
the largest honey producers in Africa, producing 42,000 tons of honey (FAO, 2010). The 
honey export trade was 28 tones in 2005, 415 tones in 2006 and 242 tones in 2007. Bees 
wax export grows from 253 tones in 2005 to 422 tones in 2007. Despite the increasing 
trend in honey and beeswax export, it still accounts for less than 1 % of the total honey 
production (Gezahegne, 2006).  
 
Ethiopia‟s diverse agro-ecology can support production of temperate, sub-tropical and 
tropical fruits. Production of fruits has been in the hands of smallholder farmers who 
perform  subsistence  agriculture.  Among  the  total  fruit  produced  in  the  country,  only 
1.68% was exported in 2003 (Kahsay et al, 2008). More than 47 thousand hectares of 
land was under fruit crops in Ethiopia and 350,000 tones of fruits were produced in the 
country (CSA, 2008). The production and the marketing performance of fruit have been 
weak due to the poor coordination in the supply chain where the government solely holds 
the input distribution. Lack of private sector participation in the production, processing 
and distribution of inputs contributes to the poor production and market performance of 
fruit in Ethiopia (Kahsay et al, 2008). 
 
In Ethiopia the market is imperfect due to poor infrastructure, high transaction costs and 
weak institutions (Gebre-Medhin, 2001) and weak private sector and trader involvement. 
Traders conduct personalized trade and rarely use contracts to obtain required supply of 
agricultural products. The major coordination mechanism employed in crop market is 
direct  purchase  from  the  spot  market,  followed  by  purchasing  through  agents  and 
collectors. Cooperatives as a supply source are also employed (Gebre-Medhin, 2001). 
However, no rigorous study has been made on determinants of the vertical coordination 
of agrifood products such as dairy, honey and fruit in Ethiopia. This study, therefore, 
aims at answering the question: “What factors determine the trader-suppler coordination 
in agrifood products in Tigray, Northern Ethiopia?”  
 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: the next section briefly reviews 
the literature and theoretical framework; section three gives a brief description on the 
methodology; the fourth section presents the results; section five  presents the discussion 
and the last section concludes the paper with some policy implications. 
2. Conceptual Framework 
2.1. Literature 
Vertical coordination is the process of harmonizing or synchronizing several interrelated 
and sequential decisions involved in efficiently producing and marketing the food supply 
(Branson  and  Norvell,  1983).  VC  can  be  thought  of  as  an  institutional  arrangement 
between two extremes of spot market and full ownership.  Within the interval, there are 
contracts  and  alliances  of  which  contracting  takes  the  lion‟s  share  in  agrifood 
coordination in the developed and the developing world. The degree of control of the 
integrator  increases  when  one  moves  along  from  the  spot  market  to  full  vertical 
integration (Peterson, Wysocki and Harsh, 2002:152). VC may occur at various stages in 
a supply chain.  3 
 
The  main  motivation  of  actors  to  engage  in  vertical  coordination  is  to  minimize 
transaction  costs  (Williamson,  1979).  Transaction  costs  are  the  costs  of  making  an 
exchange and comprise of information, negotiation and monitoring costs.  Transaction 
costs  are  a  result  of  the  opportunistic  behavior  of  economic  agents  assuming  that 
opportunistic behavior leads partners not to share information, specifically in the open 
market. VC mitigates against opportunistic behavior because mutual interest guides the 
exchange relationships (Peterson, Wysocki and Harsh 2001). Traders prefer contracts to 
open  market  transactions  in  case  where  sellers  demonstrate  a  high  tendency  of  self 
interest  and  opportunistic  behavior.  Such  opportunistic  behavior  depends  on  the 
characteristics  of  transactions  which  include  (1)  the  uncertainty  about  product 
characteristics such as price, supply and quality, (2) the high dependency on specific 
suppliers due to relation-specific investments, and (3) the low frequency of transactions: 
  First,  the  degree  of  quality  uncertainty  forces  firms  to  have  commitments  with 
members  in  the  supply  chain.  Uncertainty  over  product  quality  or  reliability  of 
supplies drives channel members to contract as a warranty to quality and supply. If 
product characteristics are easily observed which do not require detailed inspection at 
the time of delivery, open markets may work well compared to contracting (Hobbs 
and Young 2000). However, for milk products in rural markets, the product quality 
cannot be easily observed and it demands much time to inspect and check the quality.  
Hence, closer coordination may be preferred to open markets.  
  Second, investments in specific assets (both human and equipment) will lead to have 
consistent  supplier  for  the  processor  that  may  expose  the  firm  to  opportunistic 
suppliers. Transactions that involve asset specificity do not give room for the investor 
to use the asset alternatively that drive the investor to commit to the partner through 
vertical coordination rather than relying on spot markets.  Asset specificity involves 
ex  ante  investment  that  are  specific  to  the  transaction  (Williamson,  1979).  The 
investor wants to make sure that the transaction is certain that encourages vertical 
coordination.  This  lead  to  closer  coordination  to  mitigate  against  opportunistic 
supplier behavior and  when there is  risk to rely on the open market  (Hobbs  and 
Young, 2000; Williamson 1979). 
  Third, frequency of transactions also characterizes transactions; transactions can be 
frequent  or  rare  depending  on  the  nature  of  the  product.  When  transactions  are 
frequent, it allows better information exchange, build up of trust and lower costs of 
non-compliance (Williamson 1979).  
These transaction characteristics are in turn determined by product characteristics such as 
the  perishability  of  products  that  force  traders  and  producers  to  look  for  quick 
transportation,  movement  and  secured  market  that  drives  them  to  closely  coordinate 
(Hobbs and Young 2000). However, negotiation costs tend to be high since products like 
milk and honey are easily adulterated in rural markets. Hence, adulteration of quality 
forces traders to vertically coordinate so as to guarantee quality. 
In the context of substantial market imperfections, additional drivers but also barriers 
exist influencing the propensity to vertically coordinate. Additional drivers include access 
to technology, information or credit (Singh, 2002). Barriers can be related to individual 
factors such as gender, age, education, experience and the wealth situation of actors, as 
demonstrated  by  Abdulai  and  Birachi  (2009),  Hobbs  and  Young  (2000),  Davis  and 
Gillespie (2007); Franken et al., (2009), and Key and McBride(2003).  4 
 
2.2. Model 
The  decision  whether  to  vertically  coordinate  is  a  discrete  choice;  and  agents  prefer 
vertical coordination to open markets if the net cost of making transactions is lower using 
VC  than  in  open  markets  (Key  and  McBride,  2003).  In  addition,  Key  et  al.  (2000) 
identified both fixed and proportional transaction costs. For example, if there are several 
smallholder sellers in the market and the firm wants to buy large volume, the searching 
and inspection time will vary. Hence, if searching cost is high, traders may prefer vertical 
coordination to open markets. Time spent to reach to the market is fixed transaction cost 
and if they are higher, vertical coordination will be the likely coordination mechanism. 
Formally, traders seek to minimize total costs (TC) of the products they procure which 
are represented as: 
.(1) … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … FTC + PTC) + Q(P = TC  
where Q is the quantity to be procured, P is the purchasing price of the product, FTC is 
fixed transaction cost that includes search costs, and PTC is proportional transaction costs 
such as transportation costs and inspection costs that vary with the volume of purchase 
(Q). Traders choose a coordination mechanism „v‟ to „s‟ if the former minimizes net costs 
for the transaction which is represented as:   
    ..(2) … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … s  v all for      , TC < TC s v  
Hence, the objective function is  to minimize the total cost by choosing a coordination 
mechanism v from alternative coordination mechanisms c.:  
....(3) … … … … . .......... … … … … n} … 1,2, = c FTC, + PTC) + Q(P = min{TC = v  
s.t. 
    ..(4) … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … s  v all for      0, < TCs - TCv    
As transaction cost is one of the components of total cost, factors affecting transaction 
cost also affect the amount of total cost and the profit maximizing behavior.  However, 
the net cost saved in each coordination mechanism may not be directly  observed but can 
be represented by  their latent net costs saved TC*, such that the observed coordination 
mechanism  represents  one  and  zero  otherwise,  the  threshold  for  all  v  and  s  can  be 
formulated as  
..(5) … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … s  v all for      ,
0











v and s represent two different coordination mechanisms. Then, the equation to choose 
vertical coordination can be specified as: 
..(6) … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … }   + Z + X = {TC* min  = v c   c c  
where   represents a vector of variables affecting transaction costs such as sales volume, 
capital, specialization of firms, difficulty of getting market information, location and 
product characteristics;  represents other variables determining the choice of vertical 
coordination that are related to credit need of the trader;  and β and    are parameter 
coefficients to be estimated and   are i.i.d error term. Hence, the main driver of vertical 
coordination includes transaction costs emanating from the need of firms to get market 
information, better quality, and secured supply. Moreover, transaction costs are resulted 
from the capacity of firms explained in terms of their sales volume and capital. Therefore, 
from this, we can develop the following a priori expectations on the size and direction of 
the influence of explanatory variables on one‟s choice of vertical integration. 5 
 
1.  Absence of quality assuring mechanism exposes traders to quality adulteration and 
forces them to vertically coordinate so as to guard risk of poor quality. Thus, firms 
specializing in trading particular agrifood product may face high degree of quality 
adulteration if they acquire the product  from  several  smallholder farmers in  open 
markets.  
2.  The larger the size of firms, the huge the volume of products required and the greater 
will be the market risk they face in terms of shortages and searching costs. Thus, 
larger firms prefer vertical coordination to open markets. 
3.  Location  of  traders  is  associated  with  the  presence  of  institutions  to  enforce 
agreements. Traders in large towns (zonal towns) are with better institutions to reduce 
ex post monitoring costs.  
4.  Perishable products with high degree of quality adulteration increase the propensity to 
vertically coordination. 
5.  Experienced traders are well informed about the market and are less vulnerable to the 
opportunistic supplier behavior and prefer open markets to vertical coordination.  
6.  Traders favor vertical coordination as sources of credit. Credit payments give traders 
time to sale and settle payment and this motivates firms to prefer closer coordination 
to open markets. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Description of the study area  
The Tigray Region has an estimated total population of 4,314,456; among which 19.5% 
are urban inhabitants (CSA, 2008).  The region is primarily agricultural and more than 
80%  of  the  population  is  employed  in  the  sector  though  agriculture  is  dependent  on 
unreliable rainfall. Livestock also play significant role in the rural economy of Tigray. 
They are sources of draft power for tillage and transportation, cash income from sale of 
livestock  and  livestock  products,  food  such  as  milk  and  honey  for  household 
consumption and manure to maintain soil fertility.  A survey study which is embedded in 
the case area of Geba catchments (5200 km
2) was set up. The catchment represents the 
main agro-ecological zones of the Northern Ethiopian Highlands. Ten towns comprising 
of diary, honey and fruit traders and processors were selected considering them as traders 
located in the towns where producers regard them as their nearest market.  
3.2 The data 
The  data  used  in  this  study  were  collected  from  primary  sources.  A  structured 
questionnaire was administered in May 2009 in 10 towns of Tigray to a sample of 247 
dairy, honey and fruit traders and processors (i.e., 90 dairy related traders, 103 honey 
traders, and 54 fruit traders). We selected sample traders from 10 towns located within 
the Geba catchment. Using a systematic random sampling technique sample observations 
were drawn from the 2007 business census of the Tigray Regional Bureau Trade and 
Industry. Replacements were made in case the trader was no longer active in the business. 
As  all  the  towns  within  the  catchment  were  included,  the  data  well  represent  the 
circumstances under study.  
3.3 The Probit Model 
In remote rural markets in Ethiopia, cooperatives are popular that involve contracting and 
commitment of its members to supply fresh milk or honey via the marketing cooperative. 
Thus, spot markets and vertical coordination (largely contracting) are the most common 
methods of coordination mechanisms practiced in rural Ethiopia. Thus, one‟s decision to 
get involved or not in one of these coordination mechanisms is a discrete choice. This can 6 
 
be specified as a choice model (equation 7) and the parameters can be estimated using a 
Probit model (Green 2002). 
    ) 7 ..( .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... )......... ' ( ) / 1 Pr( X X Y  
where  '  is the coefficient of the unknown parameter and  X  is a vector of explanatory 
variables and  (.) represents the standard normal distribution function. Parameters are 
estimated using maximum likelihood estimation technique. 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 The Dairy Supply Chain  
The survey revealed that traders often got supply of fresh milk from the smallholder 
farmers producing milk at the household level. Most of the smallholder farmers produced 
and distributed fresh milk and butter through the open market and contract. Marketing 
cooperatives were also serving as a selling point to the smallholder producers signing 
contracts with the cooperative. Producers acquired exotic breed cows mainly from the 
district  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  Office  (ARDO).  Furthermore,  the  Relief 
Society of Tigray (REST) – a local NGO, World Vision-International NGO, religious 
institutions  (Catholic  Church  and  the  Ethiopian  Orthodox  Tewahido  church)  were 
supplying inputs to cooperatives and individual farmers.  
Dairy traders were mainly holders of cafe and snack businesses that were selling boiled 
milk, yoghurt, and butter to consumers. No processor was operating in the region. There 
were also collectors who collected and distributed fresh milk to the cafes‟ and snacks. 
Dairy marketing cooperatives were also distributing to other traders in the chain. Such 
cooperatives  were  selling  several  dairy  products  (fresh  milk,  yoghurt)  to  consumers. 
Consumers could also acquire fresh milk and other dairy products from producers or 
cooperative shops. Consumers used to buy boiled milk, yoghurt and other forms mainly 












Fig. 1 Dairy supply Chain 
Source: Authors’ own mapping from survey and secondary sources 
The coordination mechanisms employed for dairy products were the spot market, the 
marketing cooperatives  and contracting.  Traders of dairy products  were cooperatives, 
collectors, café, pastry houses, and snacks. These traders got their fresh milk through 
contracts from suppliers. Marketing cooperatives were used as a selling point/collection 
centers and they were doing better as responded by the administrators and the cooperative 
chair persons except problem of demand. The main reason for their performance was 
their ability to meet buyers‟ requirement by supplying better quality as they have quality 
control mechanism. Moreover, they used to supply differentiated products and got trust 
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Dairy traders relied mainly on farmers who meet the requirements with respect to quality 
and quantity and delivering it to the place where traders need it. Hence, transportation 
and transaction costs of traders were minimized.  4.2 The Honey supply Chain 
 
In all districts covered, honey has been supplied from farmers to traders. However, the 
survey revealed that sources of supply of input and technology were mainly from the 
Agriculture and Rural Development Offices, REST and other NGOs. The regional and 
district ARDOs emphasize on increasing production rather than value added activities 
and  marketing.  Traders  in  the  channel  rarely  supply  technology,  input  and  credit  to 
farmers.  Dimma  beekeeping  and  honey  processing  PLC  had  signed  contract  with  17 
cooperatives  in  2007  and  provided  beehives,  honey  extractor,  protective  clothes  and 
honey container. However, a few of the cooperatives were successful to deliver honey 
back to Dimma complaining that the price offered was below the market.  
 
As it is depicted on figure 2, the honey supply chain contains individual farmer receiving 
inputs from various government and development organizations; produce honey and sell 
it to the spot market or collectors, traders, or multipurpose cooperatives. Moreover the 
chain  comprised  of  producer  cooperatives  that  produced  honey  and  supplied  to 












Fig. 2 Honey supply chain 
Source: Authors’ own mapping from survey and secondary sources 
4.3 Fruit Supply Chain 
The market participation of fruit producers has been weak due to small amount of production, 
poor  preservation  technologies  and  little  support  from  the  development  agents  and  the 
government. Little participation has been observed from the private sector in input and 
technology distribution and fruit processing in the region. Thus, the fruit supply chain in 
the region is weak that lacks proper coordination. Production of fruit has not been in a 
stage  to  attract  regional  traders;  and  the  traders  mainly  use  wholesalers  as  the  main 
supply source. In Tigray, the majority of the fruits are supplied from central and Southern 
parts of the country. Hence, the supply chain comprised of two major sources: the first 
chain was organized around producers within the region, for this chain, inputs were from 
development agents (government) and farmers are encouraged to produce fruit and they 
used to sell their product to the wholesaler, retailer or consumers directly. The second 
supply chain is organized through distributors from other regions; that is wholesalers 
transport  from  surplus  producers  of  other  regions  and  disseminate  via  retailers  and 
supermarkets and then to consumers. The supply chain for fruit is presented in figure 3. 
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of traders in the region. As the volume of production is very small and the agricultural 
extension  is  at  its  infant  stage,  wholesalers  and  retailers  in  the  region  rely  on  other 
wholesalers. However, the demand for fruit is increasing triggering expansion of fruit 
production and trading in the region. Consequently, fruit trading becomes one of the 










Fig.3. Fruit Supply Chain 
Source: Authors’ own mapping from survey and secondary sources 
4.4 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics indicate that 37 % of the respondents used vertical coordination 
(contracts and cooperatives) and the rest 63.5% relied on open markets. This implies that 
open markets are the most common coordination mechanism employed by traders in rural 
Tigray. Male headed traders account for 51% of the respondents with the remaining 49% 
female headed. The average level of education was six years of schooling. The business 
experience of traders‟ was on the average eight years of stay in business. The average 
starting capital was about USD 499.455 (ETB 8246.74)
1. Traders perceived that getting 
market information was not so easy. The average annual volume of sales traders made 
was 10.851 tones. Nearly 54% of the  traders specialized in one product carrying dairy, 
honey or fruit products. The rest 46 % used to sell variety of convenience products 
together with milk, honey or fruit. Nineteen % of the traders preferred to make payments 
on account. These traders might  need suppliers to postpone payment. Thirty seven 
percent of the traders carried on dairy products, and the rest 42.3 % and 21.2 % were 
honey and fruit traders respectively. Regarding the location of traders, 45 % of the traders 
were located within the zonal towns with better institutions where as the rest 54 % were 
located within district towns. The summary statistics is presented on Table 3. 
Table  3. Statistical summary of variables 
Variable  Observation  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Vertical coordination  241  .37  .4825  0  1 
Gender  241  .51  .5009  0  1 
education  241  6.41  4.4963  0  18 
Starting capital  241  499.46  20017  0  9690.0 
Experience  241  8.19  9.5045  .14  42.4 
Difficulty of getting mkt 
information  241  2.0747  .6604  1  4 
Sales volume  241  10.8514  60992.09  0.002  86.4 
Credit payment  241  .186722  .3905  0  1 
Specialization  241  .5394191  .4995  0  1 
Source: Survey 2009 
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4.5 Results from the Probit model   
The  results  from  the  Probit  model  are  presented  in  Table  4.  We  preferred  to  run 
regression of the pooled data to capture product characteristics. Moreover, larger sample 
size also provides efficient estimation of unknown parameters since Maximum likelihood 
estimation  is  used  in  the  Probit  model.  Furthermore,  Chow  test  was  conducted  to 
reconfirm treatment of the pooled data together for the three products. The test indicated 
that running the pooled data would significantly reduce the residual sum of squares (The 
F-statistic  (11,216) =1.58 that is far less than F-critical  (11,216) =2.33 at 1 % significance 
level). To minimize potential endogeniety problem of VC on capital, we used beginning 
capital as lag variable.  
 
Our interpretation  of the model results  takes  several categories.  The first  category  is 
related  to  information  cost;  i.e.,  the  perception  of  traders  regarding  the  difficulty  of 
getting market information and it was found that those who perceived market information 
was hard to find favored vertical coordination and it was statistically significant at 5% 
significance level. The volume of sales was taken as an indicator for transaction costs in 
terms  of  searching  buyers  as  the  majority  of  suppliers  were  smallholder  producers 
(Abdulai and Birachi, 2009). We anticipated that firms with large volume of sales would 
face high searching costs to buy huge volume from smallholders if it was made in open 
markets. Therefore, large volume of sales urged traders to vertical coordination so as to 
minimize searching costs. The model result revealed that large volume of sales triggered 
traders to adopt vertical coordination. Moreover, higher capital shows an investment on 
specific assets that might drive traders to vertical coordination. Hence, the model result 
revealed that those traders with big capital tend to favor vertical integration. 
 
The other category is whether vertical coordination was driven by credit needs of traders. 
Model  result  revealed  that  traders  regarded  contracts  as  sources  of  finance  for  their 
operation. Those who preferred to pay on credit favored vertical coordination and it was 
statistically  significant  at  1  %  significant  level.  Those  traders  who  solely  operate  on 
single product (buy and sell only dairy, honey or fruit) might need uninterrupted supply 
to meet client requirements with the specific product (Key and McBride, 2003). Those 
specializing  firms  would  need  to  maintain  their  reputation  by  supplying  relatively 
standardized products to their clients. Therefore, firms specializing on particular agrifood 
product favored vertical coordination than open markets that would help them to create 
long term relationship with the suppliers to safeguard good quality agrifood product. If 
they bought from open market, traders would suffer from substandard products with high 
negotiation  costs.  These  desires  of  the  trader  might  trigger  to  vertically  coordinate 
compared to those who sporadically buy and sell agrifood products. The empirical model 
result revealed that those traders operating in one product favored vertical coordination. 
 
Coordination  choice  is  also  affected  by  the  product  characteristics  since  it  affects 
transaction  characteristics.  Frequency,  perishability  and  ease  adulteration  of  products 
motivated traders to close coordination as market security and warranty to quality (Hobbs 
2003). Milk and honey in rural Ethiopia were easily adulterated that demands traders to 
find mechanisms to safeguard good quality. Therefore, high negotiation costs spent in 
terms of quality inspection for dairy and honey products might urge traders to rely more 
on vertical coordination than open markets compared to fruit traders.  10 
 
Furthermore, individual characteristics such as gender and experience of the trader were 
included in the model. The empirical model revealed that women traders favored vertical 
coordination as the coping mechanism for limited contact and lower economic condition 
women  have  within  the  community.  Experience  of  traders  was  found  negatively 
contributing to vertical coordination because experienced traders are expected to be well 
acquainted  with  the  market  and  suppliers  that  enable  them  reduce  the  opportunistic 
supplier behavior. More experienced traders have better market knowledge that would 
help them reduce cost resulted from opportunistic trader behavior and hence favors open 
markets (Hobbs and Young 2000; Key and McBride, 2003).  
 
Negative marginal effect of gender refers to that female headed trader would result in a 
rise in the probability of vertical coordination by 20.2 percent. Similarly, a year increase 
in the experience of the trader would result in one per cent fall in the probability of 
vertical  coordination.  If  a  trader  perceived  that  market  information  was  difficult  to 
acquire, there would be 28.2 per cent increase in the probability of vertical coordination. 
One per cent change in the quantity of sales would result in 2.24 per cent increase in the 
likelihood of vertical coordination. Similarly, a one percent change in capital would result 
in 22.78 per cent increase in the likelihood of vertical coordination. If a trader specializes 
in one product, it would result in 21 per cent increase in the probability of VC. The need 
of the trader to pay on account would result in 71 per cent increase in the likelihood of 
VC. An entry of a dairy trader and honey trader would result in 56 per cent and 30 per 
cent  increase  in  the  probability  of  joining  vertical  coordination  respectively  but  28 
percent decline in the probability of joining vertical coordination by fruit traders. 
Table 4: Marginal effect (Probability of VC=1) 
Independent variables  Parameter  Std. Err.  z 
Gender  -0.2021**  .0866972  -2.28 
Education    0.0078  .0109991  0.72 
Experience    -0.0105**  .0048794  -2.15 
Information is easy to get  -0.2824***  .0746094  -2.88 
Information is Difficult to get  Base     
Need for Credit   0.7166***  .1150471  3.72 
Location (Zone Town)  
District Town 
0.0947 
Base  .0871562  1.09 
Specialization   0.3125***  .1060632  2.84 
Dairy    0.5779***  .1161923  4.44 
Fruit     -0.1992*  .0963063  -1.73 
Honey   Base     
Starting capital      0.0278*  .027828  1.88 
Sales volume   0.0224**  .0224536  2.09 
Number of observations  241     
Wald chi2(11)  69.24***     
Pseudo R2  0.5490     
Percent correctly Predicted  87.14     
,*,**,***, significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent significance levels 
5. Conclusion and Implications 
The agrifood supply chain consisted of several actors who used to perform little value 
addition  except  making  refinements  and  little  processing.  The  actors  in  the  agrifood 
supply chains composed of large number smallholder producers, retailers, cooperatives, 
wholesalers and consumers. Loose coordination prevailed among successive stages in the 11 
 
chain. Thus, high transaction costs, risk of poor quality, and little input and technology 
support  characterized  the  agrifood  supply  chain  in  Tigray.  Open  market  mechanisms 
were  found  dominant  though  contracts  and  cooperatives  are  emerging.  Vertical 
coordination  has  been  dominantly  practiced  in  the  dairy  supply  chain  as  it  is  highly 
perishable and vulnerable for adulteration. Desire for secured supply source in terms of 
quality and quantity triggers traders to vertical coordination.  
 
The study revealed that traditional spot markets are the popular methods for honey and 
fruit products traded in the region. As a coping mechanism to information asymmetry and 
to  safeguard  good  quality,  traders  tend  to  vertically  coordinate.  Therefore,  closer 
coordination  would  enable  traders  to  reduce  opportunistic  behavior  and  information 
asymmetry and acquire credit services even from suppliers. Traders also tried to assure 
quality  through  closer  coordination  as  a  warranty  to  quality  and  consistent  quantity 
delivery.  
 
Policy makers need to focus on establishing quality assuring institutions and prepare a 
platform for private businesses to have closer trading relationship with suppliers. It is 
suggested that policy makers need to consider private sector as development partners so 
as  to  upgrade  the  supply  chain  that  will  in  turn  contribute  to  the  improvement  of 
production  and  quality  of  agrifood  products.  Concerned  government  organizations 
operating on rural development need to consider traders as partners for development and 
facilitate coordination between producers so that they can resolve input and credit market 
imperfection; they can also facilitate technology transfer to improve quality and quantity 
of agrifood products. It will also help them mitigate the market risk prevailing in rural 
Ethiopia.  
 
Furthermore, strengthening marketing cooperatives should also be among the strategies 
to upgrade the supply chain because they perform collection and processing so as to 
improve the shelf life of agrifood products. Cooperatives also supply products that meet 
the  quality  and  quantity  requirements  of  other  traders  relieving  traders  from  high 
transaction costs for searching buyers and quality inspection. Strengthening traders with 
better processing devices will enable them improve the shelf life of agrifood products; 
motivate them to invest in agro-processing industries should also be among the policy 
intervention recommended to upgrade the supply chain and to get smallholder producers 
connected with the global agrifood chains. Development and financial institutions need to 
consider  building  the  capacity  of  these  traders  so  as  to  strengthen  and  upgrade  the 
agrifood supply chain in the region. This will play important role in improving the gains 
of  traders  and  producers  from  the  subsector  and  better  living  standards  to  the  rural 
households. 
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